This paper critically examines the concept of accountability as it is understood in two-party systems and majoritarian democracy, namely, the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters' capacity to 'throw the rascals out' is one of the main normative appeals of two-partism and the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this paper uses a spatial model to show that in at least two
4 always permitting voters to throw the rascals out (Vowles 1999: 141-142) . However, such occurrences are largely the exception. 1 This paper adopts a different stance. It critically examines the concept of accountability as it is understood in discussions of majoritarianism and two-partism. It argues that a fundamental feature of the notion of accountability as 'throwing the rascals out' is that, no matter how badly a government behaves in a two-party system, it will be ejected from office only if there exists something better to replace it. If voters deem the opposition party to be even worse, then the governing party is safe. The paper considers two scenarios in which that might be the case. The first concerns a government that shifts away from the median-voter position but is re-elected because the main opposition is further away from the median voter. The second entails disenchanted radical voters seeing their preferred party move closer to the medianvoter position but are then unwilling to support the main opposition because it is even further away. The paper shows that minor parties and voter abstention are imperfect responses to accountability failures. The paper draws on examples from two key Westminster democracies, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, to illustrate its points. It shows how more open structures of party competition based on proportional representation (PR) could have eased these countries' accountability problems.
Despite the limited number of existing majoritarian systems, the analysis of two-partism continues to be relevant. First, there remains a tendency, particularly in the Anglosphere, to assume that two-partism represents the epitome of democracy. This study undermines one of majoritarianism's core virtues, namely, its understanding of accountability. Secondly, the paper contributes to the debate about electoral systems. There is a tendency to assume that SMP is best at delivering accountability while PR is better at achieving representation 5 (Norton 1997; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999; see also Ezrow 2010) . This paper argues that accountability is not always delivered under SMP, and may even be better achieved under PR, through partial rather than wholesale alternation in government.
The paper is organised as follows. The first section recounts how accountability functions in two-party systems. The second section presents theoretical examples of how accountability might not work as intended. The third section examines some imperfect accountability options available to voters, such as abstention and supporting minor parties. The next two sections consider examples of these problems in Britain and New Zealand, before the final section reflects on the limits of regarding the ability of voters to 'throw the rascals out' as the benchmark of democratic accountability.
ACCOUNTABILITY IN TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS
The starting point of the present analysis of two-partism is the majoritarian model of democracy. Often referred to as the Westminster Model, majoritarianism is a form of democracy in which the normative basis for government is the representation of majority opinion among the citizenry (Powell 2000: 47-88; Lijphart 2012: 9-29) . In this system, voters have a choice of governing alternatives and the one that secures a majority forms the government. Checks and balances on executive power should not restrain the government giving expression to majority opinion. Majoritarianism is contrasted with 'proportional' or 'consensus' democracy, which is based on the representation of the broadest range of citizen opinion rather than just majorities (Powell 2000: 89-114; Lijphart 2012: 30-45) .
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Majoritarian democracy works best under two-partism, which provides voters with one governing party and one opposition party to offer voters an alternative government (Sartori 1976: 185-192) . Two-partism is normally associated with the SMP electoral system -some defences of majoritarianism use the terms almost interchangeably (e.g. Norton 1997; PintoDuschinsky 1999) . SMP plays both a limiting and an enabling role for voters. It effectively limits voter choice to two major parties. First, it sets a high electoral threshold for victory in each district and thereby hinders smaller parties' ability to win seats. Secondly, it provides a disincentive for voters to 'waste' their votes on parties with no chance of winning (Cox 1997: 69-98; Duverger 1964; Lijphart 1994; Riker 1982) . But in limiting voter choice to two options, SMP simultaneously enables voters to elect the government directly, as the party that wins the most seats will, by definition, achieve a legislative majority. To remove the governing party, voters can switch to the other major party, with SMP making their task easy: a plurality of votes for the challengers will (usually) deliver it a legislative majority.
Two of the strongest normative arguments made for majoritarianism (and by extension, twopartism and SMP) are that governments are based on electoral mandates and are accountable to voters. Mandates entail a prospective view of what governments have been given the authority to do by voters at an election, usually based on policy promises in manifestos (Powell 2000: 69-88 ).
2 Accountability is retrospective and involves voters judging governments on their past behaviour and whether they honoured their mandates.
Accountability is at the heart of normative defences of majoritarianism (Chandler 1982; Norton 1997; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999) . The governing party uses its parliamentary majority to implement its manifesto pledges. Pledges will not get traded away because there are no post-election coalition negotiations. With only one governing party, there is clarity of political responsibility as voters know who to blame when things go wrong (Powell and Whitten 1993) . At the following election, voters can decide whether or not the government deserves another term. If it has reneged on its promises and performed poorly, it could be voted out. Elections are the mechanism of delivering accountability, which is the ability of voters to 'throw the rascals out' (Powell 2000: 47; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999) .
At first glance, the argument of the majoritarians looks compelling. What could be better than for voters to have the opportunity to punish an underperforming governing party by removing it from office? This attribute of majoritarianism is conceded by its critics. The foremost empirical critique of majoritarianism is that of Powell (2000) , who showed that governments in proportional democracies implement policies much closer to the preferences of the median voter than majoritarian governments do. However, Powell acknowledged that majoritarian democracies perform well on governmental ejection (2000: 47-50).
The present paper argues that, even on this criterion, majoritarianism falls short. It reinforces existing critiques offered by Powell, Lijphart and others by reappraising what has traditionally been seen as one of majoritarianism's strongest features -its notion of democratic accountability. In particular, a tension may arise in two-party systems between retrospective accountability and prospective mandates because democracy involves an endless sequence of elections. If a party wins an election in time t 0 , it gains a mandate to implement its manifesto policies. If it violates its mandate by implementing different policies, voters may punish it at the next election in time t 1 by voting it out of power. However, before they do that, they must consider the policies of the opposition party. If its policies are even less palatable than those of the governing party, then at least some voters will be in a bind.
Either they throw the rascals out and punish the governing party, but in doing so award a 8 mandate to a party that would make them even worse off; or they stick with the governing party, and give it a free pass for violating its previous mandate, while in the process awarding it a new one. Either way, the accountability mechanism fails.
ACCOUNTABILITY FAILURES IN TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS
Accountability in two-party systems can be explored using a simple spatial model. In a single-shot election where the parties compete on a left-right ideological dimension, the party that positions its policies closest to the median voter will win (Downs 1957; Enelow & Hinich 1984) . The winning party would possess a mandate to implement its policies in government. However, accountability entails a retrospective judgment about what parties have previously done in office (Powell 2000: 8-9) . Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate a retrospective element into the model. That can be done by introducing an unannounced postelection shift in the government's policy position. Such shifts are entirely feasible under SMP and two-partism because these systems facilitate 'strong government' (Chandler 1982; Norton 1997; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999) ; that is, a government that can use its single-party majority status to take full control of the legislative agenda, with little need to worry about possible repercussions until the following election, which may be years away.
Assume that in a two-party system with plurality-rule voting, voters face a choice between the incumbent governing party, L (left-leaning), and the opposition party, R (right-leaning).
Further assume that L won the previous election in time t 0 by promising to implement policy at L 1 but in office it implements an unannounced change of policy to the more leftist position L 2 ( Figure 1 (a) ). If L had remained at L 1 , it would have been equidistant from the median 9 voter (MV) with party R, which is positioned at R 1 . However, by moving away from MV to L 2 , party L makes itself electorally less competitive, assuming that it remains at that position for the following election in t 1 . In this instance, MV can hold L to account by voting for R, thereby handing the election to R and in the process throwing out the 'rascals', L. From the perspective of MV, the accountability mechanism has worked and she is no worse off than she was before. Under the assumptions of spatial voting, however, MV will vote for the opposing party only if she finds herself ideologically closer to it. Figure 1 
positioned at L 1 , than she was to R, which was at R 1 . Now assume that between that election, when MV voted for L, and the next election in t 1 , L shifted to the more leftist position of L 2 .
That reduced MV's utility because policy shifted to a position further away from her ideal point. Further assume, however, that during this same period, the opposition party, R, has abandoned its former policy position and shifted to the right to position R 2 . Party R is now once again further away than L from MV. It is rational for MV to continue supporting L despite its utility-reducing (for MV) leftist shift. In this scenario, MV has no means of holding the governing party, L, to account. Its only way of doing so -throwing the rascals out -would entail supporting a party whose policies would make it worse off.
The discussion thus far has assumed that only the median voter matters in terms of accountability. The median voter is normally the focus of attention in two-party systems because its support is necessary for a party to achieve victory. It is not, however, sufficient. A party must also win the support of voters on one side of the median voter in order to obtain a majority. All voters who support a party contribute towards awarding it a mandate, and if that mandate is broken, they may seek to hold the government to account. Both V 1 and V 2 find themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum and further to the left than the governing party, L, which was elected to government in time t 0 at position L 1 . V 1 is a moderate left-leaning voter while V 2 is a radical leftist. Both voters have a preference for L over R in the sense that each is ideologically closer to L. Now assume that, once in government, L shifts from L 1 to the more centrist position of L 2 . Both V 1 and V 2 are made worse off by this shift but neither has a viable means of holding L to account at the next election. 'Throwing the rascals out' would entail voting for R at R 1 , which would make both voters still worse off than at even L 2 .
To summarise, in a two-party system based on SMP, an unexpected post-election policy shift by the governing party will lead some voters to seek to hold it to account at the following election, but in certain instances, no appropriate accountability options may exist.
Specifically, a non-centrist shift by the governing party only should lead the median voter to throw the rascals out and support the other party. However, if the other party has also undertaken a non-centrist shift, the median voter may be stuck with the governing party.
Likewise, a centrist shift by the governing party should leave radical voters on its own ideological flank dissatisfied, but throwing the rascals out would entail supporting an ideologically even more distant party, while supporting the incumbent would reward the latter for its mandate-breaking.
RESPONSES TO ACCOUNTABILITY FAILURES
The conclusion of the previous section was that some voters, far from being able to exercise accountability in a two-party system, may be faced with an unappealing choice between endorsing a mandate-breaking incumbent or supporting its even-worse opponent. However, the experience of actual two-party systems under SMP is that at least two other options exist for dissatisfied voters, although again neither is entirely satisfactory.
The first option is to abstain, whereby voters withhold their votes altogether. Extremists, such as V 2 in Figure 1 (c), might abstain out of alienation if the two main parties were ideologically distant from them (Downs 1957) . Centrists could abstain out of indifference if there appeared to be little distinction between the parties and little riding on the election (Kang 2004: 82) .
When the major parties are polarised, extremists would be more motivated to vote while centrists might be more likely to abstain, not so much because of indifference, but due to alienation from the entire system.
Abstention is an unsatisfactory accountability mechanism because it entails discontented voters withdrawing from the democratic process. Moreover, if abstaining extremists came disproportionately from one ideological flank, it might make it more likely that the party on the opposing ideological flank would win the election. The median-voter position would also shift in the direction of the opposite ideological flank and likely make government policy of either major party less palatable to the abstainers. However, although abstention is a response to voter disenchantment with two-party politics, it is not the principal focus of the present paper, which considers alternative party choices (see Enelow & Hinich 1984: 90-95 ).
The second option for dissatisfied voters under two-partism is to vote for a minor party (Gerring 2005) . The presence of minor parties offers voters the chance to cast 'protest votes': they are partly votes against the governing party, but indicate an unwillingness to vote for the main opposition party (Kang 2004) . Voters that support minor parties effectively abstain from the choice of government in a two-party system because those parties struggle to win seats under SMP (Duverger 1964) . From one perspective, voting for a minor party under SMP seems irrational: one major party's policies will offer a voter higher expected utility than the other major party's and so it would be rational to vote for the party that makes the voter better off rather than 'wasting' one's vote on a no-hoper. However, elections are repeated events and voters may look not only to the future but also to the past, as accountability demands. A voter may expect higher utility after the next election from the reelection of the incumbent governing party, but if that same party had broken its pledges after the previous election, it makes sense to punish the government. Voting for it again rewards it for its mandate violations. Voting for the major opposition party, however, leaves the voter with a lower expected utility.
One solution is to vote for a minor party, if one is available, that is ideologically close to the voter. This protest vote sanctions the government for its past behaviour while withholding support from the major opposition party that would make the voter worse off. Figure 2 shows the governing party, L, and the major opposition party, R, together with two disenchanted voters, V 1 and V 2 . V 1 is fairly centrist but ideologically closer to L than to R and therefore unlikely to support the latter. V 2 is ideologically radical and closer to L than to R, but not satisfied with either and not at all willing to vote for R. (These scenarios are similar to those in Figure 1 (b) and (c) above.) Figure 2 . Presence of third and non-centrist parties Now assume that two small parties are added to the system. One is a centrist party, T, which becomes the recognised 'third' party. As a centrist force, it attracts disgruntled voters from both major parties and adopts middle-of-the-road policies to that end (Adams & Merrill 2006; Nagel & Wlezien 2010) . The other is a non-centrist ideologically radical party, N, which is
well to the left of the other parties. V 2 is ideologically close to N and now has the option of voting for it, perhaps as a protest against the big two parties. If V 1 were disenchanted with L for some reason, e.g. it had shifted leftwards away from its previous promises, it could support T given its ideological proximity and R's remoteness. Again, this decision may amount to a protest vote, primarily against L for its failures but also against R for not being appealing enough to provide a viable alternative.
SMP tends to ensure that parties reliant on protest votes fail to move beyond the status of minor parties unless they enjoy geographically-concentrated support because of the difficulty of winning enough votes to capture a district. Even significant levels of minor-party electoral support can be compatible with the maintenance of a largely two-party parliamentary system (Duverger 1964: 216-228 In the 1983 election, the Alliance almost doubled the Liberals' vote share in 1979 but SMP severely limited its seat gains ( (Curtice & Steed 1983) . Other centrists stuck with the Conservatives, but may have done so unenthusiastically, given the Tories' considerable distance from the median-voter position. The UK election of 1983 was the first in a series in which the third party performed strongly in terms of votes but weakly in terms of seats, and the winning party achieved landslide parliamentary majorities on moderate shares of the vote (Mair 2009; Quinn 2013 ).
CENTRIST SHIFTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO NON-CENTRIST VOTERS: NEW ZEALAND, 1984-93
Centrist voters are not the only ones who struggle to hold the major parties to account in twoparty systems. Indeed, given that policy is normally fairly centrist, non-centrist voters are more likely to be consistently frustrated by two-party competition but also deprived of the means to do much about it.
The New Zealand party system was traditionally dominated by the centre-left Labour Party and the centre-right National Party (Miller 2005) . However, the system started to undergo changes in the 1980s and 1990s. On entering government in 1984, Labour surprised everyone by shifting sharply to the right on economic policy, implementing free-market reforms that alienated traditional supporters and which were not signalled in its manifesto (Nagel 1998 ).
Expert estimates of New Zealand parties' ideological positions changed markedly between the early-1980s and early-1990s (Table 2) . Both Labour and National were perceived to have shifted to the right, while the mean voter largely remained where it had been. A newlyformed coalition, the Alliance, exploited Labour's shift by positioning itself to attract dissatisfied left-wingers in 1993.
In Figure 5 , Labour's post-election shift to the right is indicated by the shift from Lab 1 to Lab 2 . For left-leaning Labour voters, such as V 2 , this shift is extremely unwelcome, as this voter's utility is much reduced at Lab 2 compared with Lab 1 . The conventional way of sanctioning a governing party that violates its mandate in a two-party system is to vote for the other main party. However, in the eyes of V 2 , National is even worse than Labour, as it is positioned further to the right at Nat. V 2 could continue to vote for Labour but then there is 20 little hope of seeing a shift to the left if the party is allowed to break its promises. Unless V 2 chooses to abstain, the only alternative is to vote for a protest party. Left-wing discontent over the actions of the Labour government led to the emergence of new leftist parties (Miller 2005: 39-40; Vowles & Aimer 1993 (Table 3 ). Voters such as V 2 in Figure 5 could support the ideologically-closer Greens (Grn) or NewLabour (NewL)
to signal discontent with Labour. Dissatisfied left-wing voters had no viable way of sanctioning Labour other than in ways that ultimately reduced their own utility. Voting for National was out of the question but voting for the Greens and NewLabour, while teaching Labour a lesson, caused the left-wing vote to fragment under SMP and widened the two-party vote-and seat gap.
The end came for New Zealand's two-party system in 1993 when a referendum on abandoning SMP in favour of PR was passed by 54 percent to 46 percent (Renwick 2011: 194-209) . The referendum was held on the same day as the general election, which produced another accountability failure. National had been elected in 1990 on a promise to slow down the pace of reform. In fact, the new government speeded it up, making significant changes to the welfare state. Once again, there was a widespread perception among New Zealand voters that a governing party had violated its mandate . The New Zealand Election Study (NZES) found that respondents discerned a shift to the right by National: on a 0 (right) to 100 (left) scale, National's mean placing by respondents shifted from 34 in 1990
to 24 in 1993. Labour shifted leftwards slightly, from 55 to 59, while the Alliance (a multiparty pact between the Greens, NewLabour, the Democrats and others) was at 68 in 1993.
The mean respondent self-placed at 49 in 1993 (Vowles & Aimer 1993: 89) . 3 The result was a 12.7 percent decrease in National's vote share and the loss of 17 seats ( Table   3 ). The right-wing vote fragmented, with the nationalist-populist New Zealand First Party and the socially-conservative Christian Heritage winning a combined 10 percent of the votes, but which resulted in only two seats under SMP. On the left, the Alliance increased the collective vote share of its constituent parties by 3.9 percent but added only one seat to the one it already held. Instead, Labour's seat tally shot up from 29 to 45 despite a lower vote share than in 1990. However, its failure to unite the left-wing vote cost it seats. Both major parties were discredited in the eyes of many voters but the electoral system prevented it from being expressed in significantly greater legislative representation for the smaller parties.
Given the long-running debate over electoral reform in New Zealand, stretching back to the early-1980s, it is clear in retrospect that two-partism was already crumbling. Following the 'wrong-winner' elections of 1978 and 1981, some (though not all) in the Labour Party warmed to the possibility of electoral reform. In 1986, a Royal Commission, set up by Labour, recommended adopting PR (Vowles 1995: 103) . The anticipation of change may have affected voter behaviour and minor-party strategy in the early-1990s. 4 The referendum ultimately sealed the fate of a widely discredited party system based on an unresponsive electoral system (Bale & Roberts 2002; Renwick 2011: 194-209; Vowles et al. 1995) .
THE LIMITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AS 'THROWING THE RASCALS OUT'
There are problems in viewing accountability in terms of 'throwing the rascals out' of government. At first glance, this form of accountability seems analogous to a football club sacking its manager. If performance is deemed unacceptable, responsibility is assigned and a change at the top is made. Supposedly in the same vein, if a government in a two-party system violates its mandate or is incompetent in office, the electorate can 'fire' it -i.e. vote it out -at the next election. However, there is a crucial difference. When a football manager is sacked, the club can recruit a replacement from a wide range of potential candidates. Open systems invariably tend to be multi-party in nature and based on PR (Mair 2006: 65-66 ).
The distinction between the closed competitive structure of two-partism and more open structures has significance for governmental accountability. Governmental choice in open systems is less restrictive than the forced-choice of two-party systems. Under SMP and twopartism, if voters do not like a government of one main party, they can opt for a government of the other party. If they do not like either, they can either choose the least-worst option, 'waste' their votes on minor parties (Duverger 1964; Cox 1997) , or abstain. None of these options enable voters to hold the government fully to account.
The situation is different when the structure of competition is open. Suppose that a major centre-left party governed alone with a parliamentary majority and that a subset of its supporters became dissatisfied with its performance. If those voters were not inclined to support the major centre-right party, they would have other options. They could vote for centrist or radical minor parties in the hope of depriving the incumbent of its majority, either 25 forcing it to form an executive coalition or turning it into a minority administration dependent on ad hoc legislative coalitions. Either outcome would likely force a change in government policy (Laver & Schofield 1990: 66-70; Strøm 1990 ; see also Kedar 2005) .
There are, for sure, other questions that arise in relation to accountability and coalition governments. First, coalition governments are not directly elected by voters but formed after elections during elite negotiations. That may raise questions about their mandates; indeed the entire notion of a mandate becomes problematical when manifesto pledges are traded off to produce a coalition agreement (Quinn 2014) . Second, a party might lose a substantial proportion of votes but remain in office as a coalition partner because it continues to hold the balance of power in parliament (Norton 1997; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999) . Third, it might be difficult for voters to hold parties to account under coalition government because they might not know which of the parties is to blame for policy decisions they dislike.
These points have validity and indicate that multi-partism is not axiomatically superior to two-partism on the broad criterion of democratic accountability. Nevertheless, on the specific form of accountability known as 'throwing the rascals out', the comparison with proportional multi-partism is instructive. The weakness of accountability under two-partism is that there is only one alternative governing option to the incumbent. Greater openness in a party system creates more options.
These points can be illustrated by reconsidering the two earlier cases. Assume that the UK had used PR in 1983 and the votes were the same as actually cast. No party would have enjoyed a parliamentary majority and different coalitions would have been possible. Figure 6 shows the same scenario as Figure 3 , with Labour and the Conservatives each having moved away from the centre, so that they end up at Lab 2 and Con 2 respectively. However, each could form a coalition with the SDP-Liberal Alliance, e.g. 'Con 2 -SL coalition' and 'Lab 2 -SL coalition'. Given the Alliance's pivotal position, it could likely have secured a more centrist coalition deal with one or other major party (Crewe & King 1995) . However, any policy package between these two potential coalition points would have made voter V 1 better off compared with Con 2 or Lab 2 . In this example, centrist voters do not need to throw the rascals out because they can dilute the rascals' influence by making them share power with the Alliance. This way, they do not need to vote for the even worse rascals of the other major party.
Figure 6. Hypothetical coalitions in the UK (1983)
A similar point could be made of New Zealand in 1990. Figure 7 shows Labour's previous shift to the right (from Lab 1 to Lab 2 ) but now includes the policy position of a hypothetical coalition between Labour (Lab 2 ), the Greens (Grn) and NewLabour (NewL) at 'Left coalition'. Again, it is assumed that PR is used, ensuring that no party had a majority. 'Left coalition' would have been more preferable to Lab 2 for voter V 2 and would have sanctioned
Labour by forcing it to join a left-wing coalition to 'keep it honest'. Naturally, the median voter, assumed to be positioned between Lab 2 and Nat, would have disliked this shift. But it was not the median voter that wanted to punish Labour for its broken promises in 1990; it 'Throwing the rascals out' is not always the best way of achieving that goal. If voters' preoccupation is with policy outcomes, there will be situations when other methods of accountability, including partial alternation in office, will better secure the desired policy change than wholesale alternation.
CONCLUSION
The ability of voters to throw the rascals out is claimed as one of the great advantages of SMP and two-partism. This paper has shown that accountability does not always function in the simple way that proponents of SMP and two-partism suggest. Dissatisfied voters may face a choice between four options: (1) throwing the rascals out by supporting a less desirable major party; (2) 'wasting' their votes on minor parties; (3) abstaining from the selection of It might be objected that this problem is atypical of two-partism. However, the cases examined earlier were not isolated. In the UK, Labour lost left-leaning votes to the Liberal Democrats in 2005, partly over the Iraq War, but retained power because the third party was hindered by SMP (Bartle & King 2006) . In 2015, the Conservatives lost votes to the rightwing UK Independence Party, which secured a 12.5 percent vote share but only one seat under SMP, as the Conservatives remained in office. In New Zealand, voters on the freemarket right flocked to the newly-created New Zealand Party in 1984 rather than vote for the centrist policies of National. It enabled Labour to win -although, ironically, Labour subsequently implemented free-market reforms (Miller 2005: 38-39) .
The case of Labour in the UK under Tony Blair, like that of Labour in New Zealand in the 1980s, draws attention to an important way in which this study is relevant. Under the influence of globalisation, many centre-left parties have shifted to the right, including these two parties but also Clinton's Democrats in the US and others (Cable 1999; Giddens 1998) . 
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The critique of the majoritarian version of accountability applies with equal force to normative defences of SMP. SMP is the link between voters and the two-party system, and the transmission belt for accountability between citizens and elites. The ability of voters to 'throw the rascals out' is routinely offered as a justification of SMP during debates about electoral reform, whether in the academic literature (Chandler 1982; Norton 1997; PintoDuschinsky 1999) or in referendum campaigns. Changes of electoral systems are rareparties that benefit from the status quo are usually able to block proposals for reform -but occasionally they become possible, such as in New Zealand in 1993 (Renwick 2011) .
Comprehending the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems is vitally important on these occasions. Accountability loomed large during the UK's (defeated) referendum on abandoning SMP in favour of the alternative vote in 2011 (see Renwick and Lamb 2013) . A deeper understanding of accountability would enhance future public debates.
Accountability is assumed to be difficult to achieve under PR. However, PR does permit partial alternation in government (Farrell 2011: 214-220) , which is a way for voters to instigate change when 'throwing the rascals (completely) out' is undesirable. Furthermore, as party competition has become increasingly bipolar in multi-party systems, with rival blocs of parties competing for executive power, voters can switch support between parties within each bloc, as a means of exercising accountability. Centrists may switch between blocs, enabling traditional accountability even under PR (Mair 2006: 70) .
The question of accountability is central to debates about democracy. This paper has argued that the most celebrated form of electoral accountability -throwing the rascals out -is not always the benchmark measure its proponents claim. Other forms of electoral accountability associated with PR, such as depriving parties of majorities or forcing them to share power, 30 can work better. Further research could profitably explore these issues in more empirical detail.
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